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Deconstructing Cabinet
Collective Responsibility
Nicola White
New Zealand politics is getting very post-modern. In
artistic terms, the new government arrangements are
decidedly cubist – all the key elements are there, but it’s
just not put together in the way you expect. Does it
matter? Is the nation going to learn to like Picasso, or at
least to live with it?
The past
To look first at the status quo until now, I have used the
diagramme in Figure 1 to teach constitutional and
governmental structure in recent years. The key feature
is the separation of powers beneath the sovereign into
three branches of  government: the judiciary, the
executive and the legislature.
At the core of the system are the twin concepts of
representative and responsible government. That is,
those who are supported by at least a simple majority
of the elected Parliament are entitled to be appointed
to executive office, where they will advise on and control
the use of the sovereign authority of the state. And
those holding executive office must regularly and
systematically account back to the Parliament for the
way in which that authority is used, and the business of
government is conducted. That democratic constraint
on the exercise of sovereign power is the result of many
centuries of constitutional evolution and, at times, battle.
In the New Zealand system, therefore, Ministers heading
the executive are also Members of Parliament (MPs) –
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they derive their democratic mandate by having the
support of the elected House of Representatives, and
must account back to it for the way in which they are
managing public funds and public power. To date,
therefore, the following have always been able to be used
as rough synonyms: being a member of the executive,
being a member of  the government, and being a Minister.
Ministers always hold two warrants: one as a Minister,
and one as a member of the Executive Council. The
Executive Council is the formal body that advises the
head of state or her representative and it is the legal actor
for many executive government actions. But sitting behind
it is the effective decision making body for the executive
– Cabinet. It is important that the Executive Council
presents unified advice to the Governor-General, and
so Cabinet and its committees provide the forum for
deciding what that collective advice will be.
Equally, it has always been seen as critical for the executive
to present a united front to Parliament, and to the public.
This discipline can be explained both in arid constitutional
terms (as in the previous paragraph), or as a matter of
brute political survival. Benjamin Franklin captured the
point most succinctly at the Declaration of Independence
in 1776: “Yes, we must, indeed, all hang together or,
most assuredly, we shall all hang separately”. (Quoted in
Palmer and Palmer, 2004, p.87). Again, it is the Cabinet
decision making system that brings individual Ministers
together and binds them into a collective decision making
process, as Figure 1 illustrates.
Cabinet itself  has no legal status or formal power – it
is an administrative or politically defined body and its
processes constantly adapt to suit the current needs of
government. Yet it is at the heart of  the modern system
of representative and responsible government in
Westminster democracies. Bagehot described Cabinet
in 1945 as “a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens,
the legislative part of the state to the executive part of
the state” (quoted in Palmer and Palmer, 2004, p.76).
The discipline at the core of the Cabinet system is the
convention of  Cabinet collective responsibility.
Conventions are not law: no court would ever take a
role in enforcing compliance with collective
responsibil ity. A convention is a political or
administrative rule about the exercise of public
power that is recognised and followed by all the
relevant actors.
As the Cabinet’s own summary of  its rules, the
Cabinet Manual is the most authoritative source of
guidance on this  convention.   I t  is  worth
reproducing the full text of the discussion of
collective responsibility in the current (2001) edition:
3.20 The principle of collective responsibility
underpins the system of Cabinet government.
It reflects democratic principle: the House
expresses its confidence in the collective whole
of government, rather than in individual
Ministers. Similarly, the Governor-General, in
acting on ministerial advice, needs to be confident
that individual Ministers represent official
government policy. In all areas of  their work,
therefore, Ministers represent and implement
government policy.
3.21 Acceptance of ministerial office requires
acceptance of  collective responsibility. Issues are
often debated vigorously within the confidential
setting of Cabinet meetings, although consensus
is usually reached and votes are rarely taken. Once
Cabinet makes a decision, then (except as provided
in paragraph 3.23) Ministers must support it,
regardless of their personal views and whether
or not they were at the meeting concerned.
3.22 In a coalition government, Ministers are expected
to show careful judgement when referring to
party policy that differs from government policy.
Subject to paragraph 3.23, a Minister’s support
and responsibility for the collective government
position must always be clear.
3.23 Coalition governments may decide to establish
“agree to disagree” processes, which may allow
Ministers to maintain, in public, different party
positions on particular issues or policies. Once
the final outcome of any “agree to disagree”
issue or policy has been determined (either at
the Cabinet level or through some other agreed
process), Ministers must implement the resulting
decision or legislation, regardless of their position
throughout the decision making process.
3.24 “Agree to disagree” processes may only be used
in relation to different party positions. Any public
dissociation from Cabinet decisions by individual
Ministers outside the agreed processes is
unacceptable.
V
ol
um
e 
1,
 N
um
be
r 
4 
20
05
6
The last three paragraphs were introduced into the
Cabinet Manual as a result of  the formation of  the
Labour-Alliance coalition government in 1999. The
development of this agree to disagree process has
been a significant evolution of the convention to take
account of mixed member proportional
representation (MMP), and the political needs of the
parties in coalition governments to maintain distinct
public profiles within the umbrella of a collective
government. The previous Cabinet Office Manual of
1996 simply stated that “Ministers whose opposition
to a Cabinet decision is such that they wish to publicly
dissociate themselves from it must first resign from
the Cabinet.” (paragraph 3.5)
The point that clearly emerges is that, although it has
long been recognised as a constitutional convention,
Cabinet collective responsibility in effect is a tool for
political discipline. It is not a core constitutional
principle in itself. It is a discipline that makes it easier
for a group of individuals to demonstrate that they
have the numbers, or the mandate, to continue to hold
executive office, and it is a self-protective political
shield that enables the government to withstand the
constant onslaught of arrows that a parliamentary
opposition fires, looking for weakness. It gives political
discipline and efficiency, and accordingly it gives
political strength. But it is ultimately a means to an
end, not an end in itself.
The convention has already been evolving for some
time. Constitutional textbooks talk of three traditional
elements: confidence (of the House), unanimity and
confidentiality. The full version of  Cabinet
confidentiality has been eroding for some time, with
the advent of open government. Academic
conferences now regularly discuss whether this strand
is still relevant at all.
The requirement of public unanimity has never been
absolute; its enforcement has always been a matter
of political judgment by Prime Ministers according
to circumstance.
The introduction of the agree to disagree provisions
extended that reality from implicit flexibility about
the application of this political discipline to
individuals, to explicit flexibility about how it
operates between political parties in a multi-party
coalition environment.
The present
So what has changed now? The new government, formed
in October 2005, is built on four separate agreements
between political parties, and each one includes
undertakings that are significant for the basic operation of
Cabinet, collective responsibility, government processes,
and the relationship between the executive and the
legislature. In other words, they develop some reasonably
fundamental parts of our constitutional system.
Labour and the Progressive Party:
a coalition agreement
New Zealand is now well  used to coalit ion
agreements. They are agreements between two
political parties who agree to form a coalition
government together. That is, both parties are inside
the executive, and work together within the disciplines
of the Cabinet system.
Predecessors to this coalition developed the agree to
disagree provisions of the Cabinet Manual. This latest
agreement builds on the experience of the last six
years of coalition and includes a clear signal that we
should expect further evolution of the discipline of
Cabinet collective responsibility, as follows:
Both parties recognise the need for parties to be
able to maintain distinctive political identities in
government and in Parliament. This applies
particularly to the smaller party and during this term
of Parliament we will further develop processes for:
• Ensuring appropriate credit for and recognition
of the policy achievements of the smaller party;
and
• The expression of different views publicly and
in Parliament.
This acknowledgement, of the need to keep working
on ways to manage the need for parties to maintain
separate public political identities alongside the system
of Cabinet government, in some ways sets the scene
for the other three agreements.
Labour and the Greens:
a cooperation agreement
The Greens have agreed not to oppose the
government on confidence and supply in order to
provide stability. In return they are to be consulted on
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a wide range of topics and to have substantial
involvement in a number of policy topics as well as
input into the budget process. That in itself  is not
exceptional. But the way in which the Greens will
participate on what are termed “level 1” topics does
arguably break new ground. In particular:
• Once the initial scope of the work has been agreed
with the Minister, the agreed Green Party representative
on that topic will have direct access to officials and will
be able to request reports from officials;
• The Green Party representative will report regularly
to the Minister on progress, which implies that the
Minister will, at least to some extent, be delegating
day to day control to the Green representative;
• Although any Cabinet committee papers will be
presented at the committee by the Minister, the
Green Party representative will be able to attend
and take part in the discussion; and
• The Green Party representative will be “a designated
spokesperson” in the area – it is possible that this could
mean that the person is able to speak on behalf of the
government on the topic, although political reality
suggests that it is more likely that the Green Party
comments will be firmly branded as separate, but will
sit seamlessly alongside government’s public utterances.
Arising from this agreement we therefore have
officials working directly to a non-Ministerial (and
non-government) MP, albeit under the broad
auspices of a Minister, and non-government MPs
being able to participate in core government decision
making processes. The practice of  substantial
collaboration with non-government parties had
already developed a long way in the previous
Parliament (particularly with United Future and
Green MPs), but this agreement foreshadows a
further deepening of those relationships, with more
substantial blurring of the line between executive
government and parliamentary roles.
Labour and NZ First, Labour and
United Future: Confidence and
supply agreements
We have had confidence and supply agreements before.
They have made clear that the support party will stay
outside government, but will back the government on
votes of confidence. In exchange there is a reasonable
measure of consultation and cooperation with the
support party on the development of key policy
matters, including aspects of the budget. But these two
agreements break new ground.
The opening sections of  both agreements suggest that
the parties are not regarded as being part of the
“coalition government”. Both parties agree to provide
confidence and supply for the term of  this Parliament
to a “Labour-led government”. There are provisions
establishing that there will be a substantial measure of
consultation and cooperation with each supporting party
on a wide range of  matters. And there is agreement
that the support parties will, by and large, vote with the
government on procedural motions in the House. So
far, so good.
But both agreements go on to give the leader of each
supporting party a ministerial position. They also apply
the Cabinet Manual provisions on collective responsibility
to the Minister, but only in relation to the portfolio
area. “In other areas ‘agree to disagree’ provisions will
be applied as necessary”.
So we now have two Ministers, who do not describe
themselves as part of the “coalition government”, and
who are apparently only partially bound by collective
responsibility. In media comment, the leaders of  the Labour
and NZ First parties have indicated that the NZ First
Minister does not intend to attend Cabinet or committee
meetings: other Ministers will present papers from that
portfolio on his behalf. The Ministerial List now has a
new category of “Ministers Outside Cabinet from other
Parties with Confidence and Supply Agreements.”
In the days immediately after the agreements were signed,
there was some suggestion that these two Ministers were
not in government at all: some NZ First members even
described themselves as being an opposition party. That
particular debate was relatively quickly resolved, however,
with the Prime Minister’s public confirmation that holding
a ministerial warrant did mean that a person was part of
the executive government.
The fact that the agreements say that the parties are not
part of the “coalition government” leaves a semantic
debate only about whether there is any difference between
executive government and the coalition government. There
is no difference in constitutional and legal terms (witness
section 7 of the Constitution Act, which makes clear that
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in the eyes of the law all Ministers are interchangeable).
But as ever in this field, the formal law is only part of  the
story. There is clearly a difference in terms of  the nature
and closeness of the political relationships, and we can see
these linguistic refinements as a genuine attempt to find
language to reflect that. (A less charitable view would be
that these contortions are no more than a political fig leaf
for those concerned about reconciling their current
ministerial positions with pre-election promises.)
What does it all mean?
What it means is that I need to redo my teaching
diagramme, to take account of the fact that we have
MPs who aren’t Ministers directing policy and attending
Cabinet committees, and Ministers who are somewhat
coy about their governmental status and apparently will
not attend Cabinet or committee meetings.
Figure 2 is my first attempt to represent the
constitutionally more complex world that the new
government arrangements have introduced. The key
changes are some new lines (indicated in bold) that
hover around and even cross the divide between the
executive and the legislature.
For NZ First and United Future, those new lines are
solid, as they represent the definite reporting and
accountability lines that follow inevitably from holding
a ministerial warrant. Officials do report to these
Ministers, and their activities do ultimately feed back
into collective decision making, even if the mechanisms
for achieving that end may be different.
For the Greens, the lines are dotted. They are not formal
accountability lines, but are more in the nature of new
lines of  communication and working relationships. The
formal lines still go from officials to the relevant
Minister, and through to Cabinet.
Whether any of these new lines are important may
depend on whether you are a purist or a pragmatist,
and whether you focus more on form or function.
From a purist point of  view, you can pick your
adjective to describe what has now been created:
unorthodox, weird – some opposition MPs have
even suggested that it is a “constitutional outrage”.
For this camp, it is a black and white world and a
Minister is either in or out of government, with no
shades of  grey.
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For the pragmatists among us, however, the question is
of  course how it works in practice. We have a long
tradition in New Zealand, and in the New Zealand public
service in particular, of  making things work no matter
how strange they look at first sight. And as noted, in
practice it was rapidly clarified that the two Ministers are
in government, but that they are participating on different
and more distant terms than other Ministers. The success
of the arrangements will depend on the working
relationships that develop, and how closely in practice
the ‘second tier’ Ministers get woven into the executive.
The important question in practice is whether all of
these people – Labour/Progressive Ministers, NZ First
and United Future Ministers, and Green Party
spokespeople – can develop ways of working together
sufficiently closely for government business to be carried
out. If  they do, it will almost certainly require lots of
time, and lots of  talking. But it could work. To bring
some current (but dubious) fashion into Bagehot’s
famous metaphor, it may be that rather than the firm
clasp of the Cabinet buckle binding the legislature and
the executive together, they would be joined by
something that looks more like a macramé belt.
On the other hand, if the individuals concerned do not
develop close and effective working relationships, and
choose instead to demonstrate regularly and publicly
that there are significant points of difference between
the various political parties, then the situation may prove
too unstable to endure for long.
The key is the agree to disagree process, combined with
the language of “good faith” and “no surprises” that
peppers the political agreements. The point, of  course,
is that the parties have to agree to disagree. Over the
past six years of coalition government, this procedure
has meant that all issues have been well worked through
in discussion first. If there was to be public
differentiation, that was well understood by all
concerned and the steps that each would take were
clearly signalled in advance. The process was also used
sparingly. In that way, the stability of  the overall
government, and its ability to work collectively, was
not jeopardised by the occasional issue where the  parties
were not able to support the same position in public.
This refinement to Cabinet collective responsibility has
been shown to work, at least on an issue by issue basis.
It is much too early to say how it will be used by NZ
First and United Future, but one interpretation of the
agreements and comments so far (including statements
in the Speech from the Throne) is that there is an
expectation that it will be available in a much more
blanket way, potentially across entire sections of
government activity. If  so, that would provide much
more of a challenge to the political discipline that
arises from the convention of  collective responsibility,
and so would also increase the challenge to the
cohesion and stability of the government. Even if such
a broad application is contemplated now, in practice
the parties may relatively rapidly pull back to a more
sparing use if there is a sense that political stability is
being threatened.
So are the changes good, bad, or
neutral?
It is possible to argue that these new developments are
simply some further steps along the same path of
gradual change that New Zealand has been following
over the last decade, both in relation to the nature of
discipline of  Cabinet collective responsibility, and the
relationship between the legislature and the executive.
These include:
• The development of the agree to disagree process
within the convention of collective responsibility;
• The changing nature of party discipline, as evidenced
by the growing strength and independence of select
committees no longer dominated by the chain of
majority government and Cabinet control of the
governing party caucus;
• The growing use of collaborative relationships with
other parties as part of the management of minority
government and the practice of building of support
for particular initiatives wherever possible across
Parliament, irrespective of the general government/
opposition divide;
• The development of new roles, such as
parliamentary private secretaries, who are non-
executive ministerial assistants, drawn from the
Parliament (but so far within the government caucus);
and
·• The occasional but increasing practice of officials
working with non-Ministerial MPs on legislation
(albeit so far with government MPs and under close
Ministerial supervision).
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It is notable that in some respects, New Zealand was
‘more Westminster than Westminster’ in the way it
operated Cabinet government by the second half of
last century. The combination of  a single chamber
Parliament and a very tight system of party discipline,
or ‘whipping’ of the party caucuses, meant that the
Cabinet was able to exert very strong control over the
system as a whole. For many years the relationship
between the Cabinet and the Parliament, mediated
through the caucuses, was tightly authoritative (hence
the prevalence of phrases such as “elective dictatorship”
and “unbridled power”).
These days, the relationships are much more about
discussion and persuasion than dictates from on high.
This development brings us closer to the working
reality of the United Kingdom Parliament, where
there has always been a much higher incidence of
open debate and disagreement, and where
governments have had to work harder to build
sufficient support for controversial reforms, even
within their own caucuses.
Minority government has seen the evolution of the
practice of  building support for reforms on an issue
by issue basis. Different groups form around different
policies. The relationship between the executive and
Parliament therefore has somewhat less of a tribal
‘them and us’ flavour – this morning’s ‘them’ could
be part of ‘us’ in a meeting after lunch. And isn’t that
what MMP was meant to be about? There was always
the suggestion that proportionality, and the likelihood
of more smaller parties in Parliament, might result in
the adoption of more consistent, consultative and
broadly supported policies. (See for example, the
Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral
System, 1986, paragraph 2.182.)
It is important not to overstate this phenomenon – politics
is still a blood sport – but defining the teams for any
individual contest has certainly become more complex.
In summary, these changes to the way in which
parliamentary and executive relationships operate, and
as a consequence to the way in which Cabinet operates,
need to be assessed as part of the ebb and flow of
these relationships over decades and even centuries.
They do not threaten the basic principles of
representative and responsible government that are at
the heart of  our democracy. Whether they are able to
be reconciled with the political disciplines needed to
make democracy function relatively smoothly remains
to be seen. But that is a political challenge, not a
constitutional problem.
It is likely to be a significant political challenge, too. Such
loosely based governing coalitions are highly unusual
internationally, which suggests that they are not the first
choice for many political and governmental leaders.
What does it mean for the conduct
of government business?
More problematic may be the forensic detail of the
governmental, public service and parliamentary
processes that sit underneath these high level
constitutional and political relationships. There are a
thousand detailed rules, procedures, understandings and
systems that let the bureaucracy function. Many of
those are built on assumptions about how those big
picture political relationships are structured.
Accordingly, some of  them may need to be revisited
in light of  the new government arrangements. Here I
simply mention three examples.
First, it is standard practice for officials to consult widely
across the government as they develop advice for
Cabinet on a particular policy topic. Most issues have
implications for several government agencies, and the
strong expectation is that all relevant perspectives will
have been brought together in a single piece of advice
for the central and collective decision making body of
Cabinet. Alongside that process for developing the
Cabinet paper is the expectation that each agency will
brief their own Minister on their perspective, and their
contribution to the issue, as the paper comes to Cabinet.
Thus information flows within government are not just
vertical – up and down between officials and their own
Ministers – they are also horizontal, across government
agencies and around the Cabinet table. If someone is
effectively a Minister for some purposes and not for others
(i.e. for their own portfolio only), do officials brief them
on the agency’s contributions on other issues? Or will they
keep secrets from their own Minister, if the Minister is not
involved in the particular policy? The pull of these processes
is likely to mean that over time the NZ First and United
Future Ministers will become more and more closely
bound into the broad range of government business, by
1000 tiny threads across 1000 different issues.
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Second, it has always been clear that public servants
serve the government of  the day. They provide advice
to and are directed by Ministers. Public service dealings
with other MPs, whether from government or
opposition caucuses, have always been strictly
controlled. Meetings occur only at the direction of the
Minister and usually in the presence of his or her office
staff, in order to keep the relationships clear. Meetings
are in general briefings to provide information – any
negotiation or brokering of policy agreements across
party lines is the preserve of  Ministers and ministerial
advisers, not the job of  a public servant. The closer
involvement of Green MPs with government processes
and the development of government policy seems likely
to require some revision of  these rules. No doubt the
basic principle will be maintained, but the protocols
that protect public service neutrality and lines of
accountability may need to adapt to accommodate new
working relationships.
Third, and building on the previous point, the Official
Information Act (OIA) sets out grounds for
withholding information in order to protect
government decision making processes. These are
written in broad terms, in order to give flexibility over
time, but even so it is possible that they may not have
sufficient flexibility to cope with officials working to
non-Ministerial MPs. This will be an issue in relation to:
• section 9(2)(f)(iv), which enables information to be
withheld “to maintain the constitutional conventions
for the time being which protect the confidentiality
of advice tendered by Ministers of the Crown and
officials”; and
• section 9(2)(g)(i), which enables information to be
withheld “to maintain the effective conduct of public
affairs through the free and frank expression of
opinions by or between or to Ministers of the
Crown or members of an organisation or officers
and employees of any Department or organisation
in the course of their duty”.
If the constitutional conventions are manifestly evolving,
will the established understandings of the scope of the
OIA provisions evolve also?
No doubt there will be answers to these and the many
other procedural questions that will arise. Administrative
systems are always flexible, and adapt. But it will take time
to discover where old systems don’t fit new relationships,
and to work out new protocols and systems that continue
to protect core values while accommodating new needs.
As ever, we will learn by doing.
Conclusion
In the last Parliament, the Constitutional Arrangements
Committee was established to describe New Zealand’s
constitutional development and to consider processes
for future reform. The Committee’s report records that
it encountered an early problem in compiling such a
description. In the absence of a written constitution,
the primary difficulty was deciding what was
and was not a significant event in New Zealand’s
constitutional development. There were many
events that were clearly socially and politically
significant … But were these events
constitutional? (paragraph 20)
Although the characterisation of  New Zealand’s
constitutional history did not come easily to us,
we rapidly agreed on the characteristic qualities
of  New Zealand’s approach to constitutional
change throughout its modern history. We
adopted the tag of “pragmatic evolution”. By
this we mean New Zealanders’ instinct to fix
things when they need fixing, when they can fix
them, without necessarily relating them to any
grand philosophical scheme.  (paragraph 26)
The agreements that enabled the new government to form
are certainly pragmatic. Whether they endure, and become
another step in New Zealand’s constitutional development,
is up to the individuals in the current Parliament. If it turns
out that these new arrangements truly are a modern artistic
masterpiece, who will claim to have painted it?
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